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Film was a most important product in the lives of the people during the 1930s. This paper 
sets out to analyse the underlying economic arrangements of the film industries of the 
U.S. and Britain during the decade in producing and diffusing this commodity-type to the 
population at large. In doing this, the paper finds a highly competitive industry that was 
built around showing films that audiences wanted to see, irrespective of the extent of 
vertical integration. It also examines the nature of the inter-relationship between the two 
industries and finds an asymmetry between the popularity of British films in the 
American market and that of American films in the British market. Our explanation for 
this is that the efforts of British firms on the American market were not sufficiently 






The film business in the U.S. and Britain during the 1930s.1 
 
This article examines the manner in which the film industry worked in the U.S. and Great 
Britain in the 1930s, focusing on the pattern of trade between firms on either side of the 
Atlantic.  A particular emphasis will be placed on the asymmetry in the performance of 
British and U.S. film producers, and specifically, on the failure of British producers to 
find sustained success in the U.S.  It was a period during which filmgoing was the 
dominant paid-for leisure activity, with revenue from the box-office in each country 
constituting two-thirds and four-fifths, respectively, of all entertainment expenditure.2 It 
was, as A. J. P. Taylor wrote,  ‘the essential social habit of the age…[which] slaughtered 
all competitors.’3 
 
The film business during the so-called ‘Classical’ period4 (1920 to 1960) evolved in 
response to two key characteristics of the behaviour of its consumers. First, audiences 
soon tired of even the most popular films, requiring a flow of new attractions to 
continuously tempt them back to the cinema. Therefore, once they had been released onto 
the market, films had short product lives: in the 1930s there was only the theatrical 
market and thus a once-only opportunity for amortisation. Indeed, so short were their 
lives as commodities that Hollywood amortised its film products over a period of 12 to 15 
months, with half the expected earnings being generated during the first 13 weeks of 
release.5 For production, this meant that the ‘major’ studios were required to market 
annually upwards of 50 new films in order to keep their product before the cinemagoing 
public. The function of distribution was to maximise the screen-time accorded to each 
film, whereas that of exhibition was to make screen-time available to a film only while 
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the paying audience was sufficiently large. Both functions had a life-or-death financial 
interest in handling the films that audiences wanted to see. Clearly, the function of 
production was to make those films, but the problem was that ex ante, producers did not 
know exactly what audiences wanted and audiences did not have a full conception of 
what it was that they liked, mostly because novelty appeared to be an essential element in 
consumer demand.6  This implies that audiences were engaged in what Arthur De Vany 
and David Walls have characterised as a discovery process.7 As a consequence, both 
production and consumption decisions were shrouded in uncertainty. It was a risk-laden 
situation, characteristic of products that have an irreducibly ‘artistic’ component and of 
course it prevails just as powerfully today. Interestingly, the tendency towards monopoly 
– suggestive of an industry in which production costs are endogenous and largely sunk, 
distribution universal, consumer prices invariant and consumer tastes highly developed – 
was thwarted by the stimulus to competition implicit in the short life-cycle characteristics 
just described and in the need to constantly innovate.8  
 
The second characteristic is the fact that audiences differentiated films qualitatively in 
such a way that a small number of ‘hit’ films were disproportionately successful at the 
box office, resulting in a highly skewed distribution of global revenues. In a series of 
articles, De Vany and Walls have provided evidence of this during the 1980s and 1990s 
in the American market.9 Sedgwick has done the same for the period 1946 to 1965,10 and 
we present further evidence for this empirical regularity from both sides of the Atlantic 
during the 1930s. In general terms this regularity arises from exhibitors constantly 
demanding from producers films that would be expected to appeal widely to consumers 
 5
and thereby generate high box-office revenues.  In the event, only a relatively small 
number of films were successful in these terms, as each film release had to compete on its 
own merits against large numbers of new rival products. The dilemma for producers was 
that high revenue-generating films tended to be those with high production values, and 
hence were costly to produce.  But for producers high budget films, while having the 
potential to generate high box-office revenues, were not necessarily profitable – the 
higher the production budget the higher were the revenues required to cover the costs of 
production and distribution.  Thus while a number of high budget films during the 1930s 
were outstandingly successful – they were the hits of their respective seasons – there 
were also a substantial number of high budget films that were markedly unsuccessful in 
that they generated considerable losses for their producers.   
 
Film producers attempted to resolve this dilemma by constructing diversified annual 
portfolios of films, diversified in terms of the variation in production budgets, genre 
composition and the distribution of star and directorial inputs.  Thus, low to medium 
budget production provided a reliable source of profits (given the relatively low box-
office revenues that were required to cover costs), and in many cases resulted fortuitously 
in hit films, but essentially it played the role of cross-subsidising the risky activity of high 
budget production.  The key to financial success during the 1930s was to be found in the 
aggregate financial performance of the annual film portfolio, with hits often emerging 
from quite unexpected parts of the portfolio.  Thus, film producers built up their 
understanding of this dynamic market through the performance of their film portfolios, 
with film making strategies and portfolio construction evolving accordingly.11  Any new 
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entrant to this market had to be prepared to undertake the substantial investment required 
to construct an annual film portfolio, and, crucially, to replicate this investment over a 
number of years in order to gain a market presence.  As will be argued, British producers 
underestimated the nature of the commitment that was required to achieve success in the 
U.S.  It will also be shown that although the industry had integrated vertically, with the 
five ‘major’ Hollywood studios and the two largest British companies operating as 
producers, distributors and exhibitors, this did not lead to exclusive exhibition 
arrangements – barriers to distribution and exhibition were not insurmountable to new 
entrants.  Indeed, the point about ‘hit’ films was that their popularity was such that they 
appeared on the screens of rival cinemas, of course for a price.12 
 
This production environment of the 1930s stands in stark contrast to that of the post-war 
period.  With the collapse of the studio system, brought about by a two-thirds fall in real 
revenues during the period 1946 to 1965, the focus of the emerging independent 
producers was increasingly on the production of hits, via the deployment of escalating 
production budgets, with a move away from lower budget production as television 
rapidly dominated the market for outputs with lower production values.13  Consequently, 
the importance of a diversified film portfolio diminished in the post-war period, with film 
making focusing increasingly on specialised, high budget production.  
 
The paper is structured as follows:  the following section presents some broad statistical 
summaries of both the U.S. and British markets - the two largest markets in the world at 
that time - and sets out the context for what follows.  A discussion of the structural 
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characteristics of the production, distribution and exhibition sectors is then presented, 
followed by a description of the sample data and an analysis of the patterns of film 
popularity in both markets.  A detailed analysis of the exhibition sector in the U.S. is then 
undertaken, which examines the hypothesis that the relative lack of success of British 
films in the U.S. can be attributed to barriers to distribution and exhibition.  Further 
detailed evidence of the asymmetry in the performance of British and U.S. films in their 
respective markets is then presented, followed by an analysis of the performance of three 
of the majors during the 1930s, emphasising the complexities of film production under 
the studio system, and the competitive environment within which British producers had to 
compete.  A final section presents our conclusions.  
 
I 
In Britain there were close to a billion admissions per annum during the 1930s, from a 
population of 47 million, averaging at 19 visits per caput, with audiences paying on 
average 10d. (= 4.17p) per visit.14 When compared to the 2.233 billion admissions in the 
U.S. in 1935, from a population of 127 million, similar statistics emerge: Americans on 
average made 18 visits per caput to motion picture theatres, paying 25 cents per visit.15  
The British market for film entertainment was in size second only to that of the United 
States during the 1930s, a fact reflected in cinema statistics. Simon Rowson estimated 
that there were 4,305 cinemas wired for sound in Britain in 1934, rising to 5,000 by the 
end of the decade, with a seating capacity of 3,872,000.16 The U.S. had almost four times 
as many cinemas in operation, rising from 14,552 to 15,701 between 1934 and 1939, and 
a greater concentration of seats, with 1 seat for every 12 inhabitants compared with the 
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ratio of 1 to 15 in Britain.17 In contrast, Germany, with a much bigger population than 
Britain’s (66 million, against 47 million) and a slightly greater number of cinemas (5,271 
in 1937), had a seating capacity of less than 2 million seats; indeed France, with a 
population of 42 million, had more seats (2,100,000) than Germany.  
 
In terms of box-office revenues, Rowson estimated box office receipts in Britain to be in 
the order of £40 million in 1934.18 This compares with estimates in the U.S. of $518 
million for the same year.19 With an exchange rate of $4.5 to £1 (based on comparative 
unit labour costs), it appears that the British market for films was approximately one third 
the size of the American market.20 This disparity in size marks a fundamental asymmetry 
that is crucial to understanding Anglo-U.S. film relations. To compete effectively with 
Hollywood – to present films of a comparable quality and expense so as to match the 
production and story-telling values common to the product of its ‘major’ studios – British 
films needed to be as popular in the U.S. market as Hollywood’s own product: they 
needed to generate comparable revenue streams.  
 
Unfortunately for British producers, this did not happen. Whereas Hollywood big-budget 
productions had, through their British subsidiary in-house distribution services, full 
access to the British market and showed themselves to be highly popular with British 
audiences, this was not the case with British big-budget films in the U.S. market, which 




This was not a failure of timidity or initiative, but the result of telling differences in the 
investment cultures of Britain and the U.S. During the 1930s, two British studios – 
Gaumont British, with Michael Balcon as head of production, and London Films, 
founded and led by Alexander Korda – made serious attempts to devise ‘international’ 
films that they believed would be attractive to American audiences.21 In the case of 
Gaumont British a New York based in-house distribution company was established, 
while the films of London Films were distributed through United Artists. Although many 
of these films received good press notices, their performance in U.S. cinemas bore no 
relationship to their popularity in the British market, and both adventures ended in 
corporate failure.22 
 
One possible explanation for the dominant performance of U.S. films in the British 
market derives from the socio-economic concept of ‘cultural discount’, introduced by 
Colin Hoskins and Rolf Mirus in 1988.23 They were working on problems in the trading 
of television programmes, and the concept was developed to explain Hollywood’s current 
contemporary global dominance in cultural trade. In essence, ‘discount’ is used in its 
literal, monetary meaning: a television programme made in cultural milieu A commands 
a certain price in its own market, but if it is exported to cultural milieu B, in which some 
or many of the constitutive cultural elements differ from A’s, its appeal to B’s consumers 
is diminished, and it has to be sold at a discount in B’s market – the more culturally 
‘distant’ is B from A, the higher is the cultural discount.  McFadyen, Hoskins and Finn 
derived a measure of cultural distance – specifically, a composite index measuring the 
cultural distance between the U.S. and each of a wide cross-section of countries – and 
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demonstrated that the price paid by each country for U.S. television programmes was 
lower the more culturally distant was the country from the U.S., after standardising for a 
range of economic and demographic factors that might also be assumed to influence 
price.24  Therefore, for any two countries, that country with the largest domestic market 
will be the dominant exporting country, with market share in the importing country being 
directly related to the size of the cultural discount, cet.  par. 
 
Such a concept would appear to be useful in explaining the success of Hollywood films in 
Britain, in view of the cultural ‘closeness’ of the two countries.  Given that the U.S. 
domestic market for film in the mid-1930s was about three times the size of the British 
market it is not surprising that Hollywood established a significant presence in the British 
market.  However, the relative lack of success that British films had in the U.S. – no 
British film entered the U.S. top 100 in the mid-1930s, the highest rank achieved being 
104 (see discussion of Table 3 below) – would imply that this concept of cultural distance 
is not a symmetrical one.  Therefore, either it has limited explanatory content, or more 
complex historical/institutional forces were at work to privilege U.S. production in the 
minds of British audiences, and/or to condemn British production as inferior in the minds 
of U.S. audiences.  Thus, undoubtedly the limited success of British films in the U.S. was 
due, in part, to the unevenness in distribution across the two markets, referred to earlier.  
But the comparative failure of top 10 British features such as The 39 Steps and The 
Scarlet Pimpernel when they were screened in the U.S. market suggests that American 
filmgoers were less interested in British cultural products, per se, being more enamoured 
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One film product is preferred to another on the basis of the qualitative density of its 
content, which will include what are known as production, acting, star, directorial, 
aesthetic and narrative values: all inputs in the production function. Bakker has shown 
that in the period from the mid-1910s the U.S. film studios, newly located in Los 
Angeles, and in particular around Hollywood, started to invest (sink) considerably more 
in unit film production than their European counterparts, while producing on a markedly 
greater scale.26 These developments were the outcome of the acceptance by cinemagoers 
of a new type of film product – the feature film – that required a new set of artistic 
conventions to carry the much longer narrative, which in turn required a new approach to 
the organisation of production.27 The process was given added impetus by the doubling in 
the demand for film entertainment in the U.S. during the 1920s.28 By learning how to 
produce films in large numbers under competitive conditions, the Hollywood studios 
developed a mode of production that endowed their films with more, and better-executed, 
audience-captivating filmic attributes per dollar invested than those of their consequently 
disadvantaged competitors. Moreover, the divergence that occurred between European 
and Hollywood production during the 1920s made Hollywood an increasingly attractive 
work location for European film talent.  
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That industry production standards were determined by Hollywood is explained not 
simply on the grounds of cinemagoers’ preferences, but also by the fulfilment of the 
necessary material condition that they were able to see its films constantly and 
abundantly. With the growth of Hollywood and the development of the studio system 
came the business of film distribution, the logic behind which is that once the sunk costs 
of production have been incurred, the resulting film product should be screened whenever 
and wherever there is a demand for it, with the proviso that the marginal costs associated 
with its distribution are covered. By the early 1920s Hollywood’s distributors had a reach 
that was worldwide,29 allowing the productivity of its films (and hence of those inputs 
that were combined in their production), measured by the number of screenings that they 
might receive, or the revenue that they might earn, to become potentially very great 
indeed.  
 
The pattern of distribution/exhibition that emerged in the U.S. during the 1920s was 
based on a price discriminatory model by which films typically diffused out in time and 
space from their initial release date in a particular film exchange, from higher order to 
lower order cinemas.  Each order, or ‘run’, in the distribution hierarchy was well defined 
according to the grading of the box-office potential of its constituent cinemas. Thus first-
run cinemas received films earlier, were larger and charged higher prices than 
subsequent-run cinemas in their respective cities and hinterlands. In the U.S., block-
booking was a key element in the system of runs, clearances and zoning, whereby 
‘…films were sold as a package, with the size of the package depending on the 
exhibitor’s needs’ and designed to maximize distributor revenues.30 Exhibitors were 
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given exclusive rights to those films in a demarcated location for a period of time. The 
whole system was policed by the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America 
(MPPDA) – the ‘major’ studios’ trade association. By the 1930s, there were 31 
exchanges in the U.S., with a further six in Canada.31  
 
The British system of distribution was determined by and then dominated by the same 
American distributors, who, given the moribund state of British production during the 
1920s, had the field largely to themselves. Indeed, such was the influence of Hollywood 
in the British market that Ian Jarvie has written that ‘British films owed their existence to, 
indeed were in a certain way parasitic upon, the exhibition industry created around the 
American [film] product.’32 In Britain, block-booking was made illegal by the 
Cinematograph Films Act of 1927, the purpose of which was to encourage domestic 
producers through the imposition of quotas on distributors and exhibitors, rising in stages, 
in both cases to 20 per cent, until 1935-36. In effect, the Act changed the risk 
environment to the advantage of the ‘quality’ end of British production because, given 
that exhibitors now had to screen a rising proportion of indigenous product, their 
preference would clearly be for films that would attract cinemagoers, especially as these 
films would have to compete against Hollywood product also being screened in the same 
locality.33 That the act was successful can be gauged by the extent to which the 
distributor and exhibitor quotas were exceeded annually, causing leading industry 
intellectual Simon Rowson to proclaim this fact  
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...as a conclusive demonstration that the Act had achieved its purpose of establishing 
an industry which might have never come into existence without the protective aid of 
this legislation.34  
 
III 
The assumption that box-office revenues can be used as an index of film popularity is 
based on the following propositions: first, film audiences are well (though never 
perfectly) informed; second, in choosing between films A, B…Z, they are revealing ex 
ante a preference for particular product characteristics such as star, genre, and/or 
directorial values;35 third, the invariance in admission prices between those films being 
screened at any one cinema, when taken together with the principle of exhibition – to 
make screen-time available to a film only while the paying audience is sufficiently large 
– implies that the willingness of audiences to pay for the set of particular pleasures 
promised by any one film, i.e., the film’s popularity, would be reflected purely by the 
lengths of the runs, hence the revenues, achieved by that film at the cinemas at which it 
was shown.36 In the context of the run-hierarchy system of release that was in place in the 
1930s, distribution/exhibition had to respond by rapidly adjusting supply to the different 
demand levels registered for those films on release, through a contingency prolongation 
or curtailment of the original exhibition contract.37 It is perhaps worth noting that because 
a cinemagoer can never be perfectly informed, the fact that a film is popular does not 
mean that, ex post, every ticket buyer will have liked the film, but rather that neither the 
number of discontents, nor the intensity of their disappointment, is sufficient to create 
word of mouth that would dissuade many potential attendees.     
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Two datasets, one for each country, have been constructed to study the patterns of film 
popularity in both countries, summary data of which can be found in Table 1. The U.S. 
dataset is drawn from the weekly reports of box-office takings of 104 first-run cinemas, 
including four in Montreal, Canada, for the 25 months from week ending 4 October 1934 
to week ending 29 October 1936, published in the film trade journal Variety. The cities 
reported were Birmingham, Boston, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Denver, 
Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City (Missouri), Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Montreal, New 
Haven, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland, Providence, St Louis, San 
Francisco, Seattle, Tacoma, and Washington D.C.38 Peter Besas provides an account of 
the apocryphal nature of some of the reporting, quoting an editor as saying, with regard to 
their accuracy, that the published grosses a decade later ‘...were as close as one could 
humanly get, however, with the caveat that there was plenty of bogus reporting and 
exhibitor cheating.’39 Nevertheless, as argued elsewhere, the trade treated the box-office 
data published by Variety with respect and while it was roughly hewn and approximate 
‘...it accorded with the experience of those whose livelihoods were bound up in the film 
business.’40  
 
In contrast, information concerning the revenues of films distributed in Britain during the 
1930s is extremely thin. Indeed, for reasons that are unclear, the trade journal, Kine 
Weekly, from which the British dataset is drawn, did not publish the box-office returns of 
the cinemas listed in its weekly report on films being screened in leading cinemas.41 To 
remedy this deficiency a proxy index of film popularity (POPSTAT) has been 
 16
constructed from the imputed box-office revenues of a sample of 88 leading London 
West End and provincial city cinemas in Birmingham, Bristol, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, and Sheffield for the two years 1935 and 










n is the number of cinemas in the sample set.         
ajt is a weighting factor for cinema j during period t, reflecting the relative revenue 
generating potential of cinema j.43  
bijt reflects the exhibition status of film i at cinema j during period t. That is, bijt takes on 
the value 1 if film i is presented as a single bill programme, 0.5 if it is part of a double 
bill, and 0 if it is not shown at cinema j. 
lijt is the length of exhibition of film i at cinema j during period t, measured to the nearest 
half week. 
 
In effect POPSTAT is an index of the relative revenue potential of each feature film that 
was programmed at least once in one of the sample set of cinemas and requires the reader 
to assume that all cinemas in the sample operated at the same level of capacity. By 
providing relative weights to each cinema, the index reflects the unequal earnings of 
potential of cinemas in the sample, hence giving greater importance to the cinemas of 
London’s West End.44 
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Table 1 reveals the comparable nature of the two samples, with similarities in the number 
of cinemas and screenings, and a close similarity in prices.45 Because the POPSTAT 
statistic is a measure of relative rather than absolute box-office performance, the actual 
revenue generated by the films in the British sample is not presented, whereas the figure 
found in the U.S. column is a simple aggregate of the revenues reported in Variety.  In 
Table 1, the predominance of single bill programmes in the U.S. dataset is to be expected, 
given the first-run nature of the cinemas in the sample and that double-bill programmes 
were the norm only in half of all the cinemas in the U.S. by this juncture of the decade.46  
That single bills were less common in the British sample can be explained by the fact that 
a greater number of films were in circulation and the legal requirement that a specified 
proportion of these had to be ‘British’ within the meaning of the 1927 Act. Another 
interesting facet of exhibition in the U.S. was the extent of live shows, with 
approximately 1,500 distinct weekly, or occasionally longer, acts featured during the 25 
months at particular licensed cinemas, often as the evening’s main entertainment. These 
acts commonly fell into the forms of: a) ‘vaudeville’ or ‘stage shows’, including 
American-type ‘follies’ shows, often top-billed by stars of the screen and/or radio; or b) 
popular orchestras, often show-casing a nationally known vocalist; or c) ‘French’ revues, 
generally containing scantily dressed women performing sexually provocative material; 
or d) local amateur talent contest evenings organised through the Major Bowes Amateurs 
organisation. In the sample, just under 15 percent of all programmes had a ‘live’ 
dimension, a level of occurrence that would moderate Hanssen’s claim ‘…that the advent 




[Table 1 about here] 
 
Although each sample of cinemas is small in relation to the population from which it was 
drawn, they do represent an altogether larger proportion of an elite group of national first-
run cinemas.48  The MPPDA calculated that there were approximately 450 first-run 
cinemas in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in 1941, which means that the U.S. 
sample represents approximately two-fifths of the cinemas in that first-run population.49 
The British sample includes almost all of the first-run cinemas to be found in the cities 
(listed earlier) from which the sample is drawn.50  
 
The significance of this investigation’s wide coverage of first-run cinemas is that the 
films that secured at least one exhibition in the sample set of cinemas, 969 in the U.S. and 
1,213 in Great Britain, could be expected to be distributed to second, third, … nth-run 
cinemas. It is true that the popularity rankings revealed in the set of first-run cinemas (see 
Table 3 below) would not be exactly replicated in lower order cinemas. An earlier study 
shows that distinctive variations in preferences existed between audiences attending the 
London West-End and provincial city cinemas and those attending cinemas in Bolton (in 
particular) and Brighton.51 It was also the case that the lower order cinemas exhibited 
films not seen in the higher order tiers. Nevertheless, local/regional distinctions in taste 
seldom affected the overall level of popularity of a first-run status film. Films that were 
the ‘hits’ of their day needed to perform extremely well in the first-run market and it was 
a matter of experience among distributors and exhibitors that, for the greater part, those 
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films that did so were also relatively popular with audiences attending lower-order 
cinemas.  
 
To test this proposition for the U.S. market, the first-run cinema box-office revenues, as 
recorded in the sample, of 93 MGM, 86 RKO and 118 Warner Bros. films released in 
1935 and 1936, were compared with their U.S. grosses (i.e., from all the U.S. cinemas in 
which they played) as reported in the complete Eddie Mannix (MGM), C.J. Trevlin 
(RKO) and William Schaefer (Warner Bros.) ledgers.52 The results of this analysis show 
that the two series were highly and significantly positively correlated for all three studios: 
correlations in excess of 0.9 occurred in all three cases, and so it is possible to say with 
confidence that films that were popular at the higher level tier of cinemas were similarly 
popular across the exhibition hierarchy.  
 
The significance of the sample set of cinemas is further confirmed by comparing the 
gross box-office revenues of all of the films reported in Variety during the period of the 
investigation with Department of Commerce estimates of the U.S. box-office of $556 
million in 1935 and $626 million in 1936.53 The aggregate of the box-office reported in 
Variety for the 104 sample cinemas – 0.6 per cent of the population of U.S. cinemas – 
sums to $121,114,613, or approximately ten per cent of the market box-office estimate of 




First-run cinema ownership was dominated in both countries by vertically integrated film 
businesses – Associated British Pictures Corporation (ABPC) and Gaumont British in 
Britain, and Loew’s-MGM, Paramount, RKO, 20th Century Fox and Warner Bros. in the 
U.S. were the major players.  Just under half of the cinemas and seats in the British 
sample were owned or controlled by the two leading British combines. In the U.S. the 
vertically integrated ‘major’ Hollywood studios controlled the programmes of over 64 per 
cent of the sample cinemas and 63 percent of their seats, with the remaining cinemas – as 
in Britain – either independents, or parts of small regionally based chains.  
 
Although it might be expected that cinema ownership was a determining factor in film 
exhibition, with exhibitors privileging those films made by their own production studios – 
thereby saving on search costs while guaranteeing in-house films a retail outlet – the 
reality was not so simple and clear-cut. Two important factors militated against this 
practice: first, in the U.S. the major chains were concentrated in particular geographic 
regions – Fox, in California, the intermountain region of Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming, and the Mid-West; Loew’s in New York, New 
York State, and New England; Publix/Paramount in New York, New England, the Mid-
West and the South and South-West; RKO in New York and New England, and Warner 
Bros. in New York City and New England.54 But even within the regions the distribution 
was uneven, with different chains being unequally represented in particular locations. 
Among the sample set of cinemas, Fox was particularly strong in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco; Publix/Paramount in Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and Minneapolis; Loew’s in 
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New York and Washington; RKO in Cincinnati and Denver; and Warner Bros. in 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.  
 
Second, the distribution/exhibition system did not work on the basis of exclusion, but 
rather on the principle of expedient inclusion. Each ‘major’ cinema chain readily 
screened the films of rival studios when their films were likely to be popular with 
audiences, not hesitating to pull its own films from billings when they proved unpopular 
with audiences. This behaviour was even more the case where one ‘major’ held a 
dominant position in the local market. On the basis of contractual evidence of Warner 
Bros. cinemas in the Long Island area during the 1930s and 1940s Hanssen has argued, 
‘…there was substantial ex post substitution of poorly performing films for better 
performing films, but with the blessing of producers – because of revenue sharing, both 
producer and exhibitor gained when film runs could be adjusted in line with demand.’55 It 
was inconceivable that in a U.S. city in which, say, RKO was not strongly represented, 
such as Chicago, the films of Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers – RKO’s major joint stars – 
would not be shown. Rather, the oligopoly that was Hollywood, based upon the fact that 
cinema real estate accounted for the bulk of studio assets and income, was built upon 
self-interested cooperative practices whereby ‘…the majors show(ed) their own films and 
each other’s’ in response to a demand for them.56 As Barry King argues with respect to 
‘hit’ films: ‘What the lucky producer has, therefore, is a monopoly (copy) right to a film 
which will give his company access to his competitor’s screen time for a price.’57  
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In effect, Hollywood ‘majors’ colluded to maintain supply irrespective of the regional 
pattern of ownership. In doing this, the studios increased the level of competition in the 
first run market, since at a point in time all main studio releases competed with each other 
in each and every first-run location. In other words, geographic concentration was 
irrelevant as a factor in the choice given to consumers. Evidence for this can be found in 
the Table 2.  In Section A the programmes of five cinemas, each belonging to one of the 
‘majors’ and each located in an area in which the respective ‘majors’ were highly 
concentrated, are counted according to production company. It is apparent that for each of 
the five cinemas other-studio product constituted a majority of films screened: the bulk of 
their gross box-office receipts was derived from films emanating from rival studios. 
However, the story is different in the less frequent situation where a chain was 
represented by only one first-run house – such as the Metropolitan, Brooklyn or Stanley, 
Philadelphia in Section B – in which case the great bulk of its product would come from 
the in-house studio (MGM and Warner Bros. respectively). From these observations it is 
possible to formulate a general rule that in a city where a ‘major’ chain was strongly 
represented by first-run cinemas, a majority of the programmes of its cinemas would be 
comprised of non-house product, but where the chain had only a single first-run outlet, 
then the supply of films screened would be much more skewed towards in-house product. 
 
Likewise, in Britain a similar pattern prevailed, in that the two major chains showed films 
from rival, principally Hollywood, studios. However, because of the much more even 
geographical spread of the chains, the urban, dataset cinemas of both chains were likely 
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to be present in the same catchment areas for cinemagoers, which meant that it was less 
likely that either would show the other’s in-house films.58 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
V 
In section III, it was demonstrated that box-office revenues (and, by extension, proxy 
measures thereof) could be used as an index of film popularity. Therefore, the box-office 
indices/revenues of the two datasets can be accepted as reflecting accurately patterns of 
film popularity in both countries. Figures 1 and 2 depict the frequency distributions of 
these popularity measures, in terms of deciles, showing them to have remarkably similar 
characteristics. In both sample sets, almost 70 percent of the films shown at least once 
generate revenues that fall in the lowest revenue decile of the POPSTAT/Variety box-
office range. Furthermore, the median revenues for both datasets occur in this decile. 
Such a combination gives a distribution with a long tail, and a wide spread of box-office 
earnings, indicating that only a very few films released onto the market could be expected 
to become the ‘hit’ films of the season. Moreover, since historically the scrutiny of the 
‘hits’ of past seasons and efforts at mathematically modelling the relations between 
production inputs, profits and popularity have failed to produce a predictive formula, it 
has been argued that a ‘hit’ film can be interpreted as, in effect, the outcome of a 




[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
These top ranking berths were very important to the major producers because of the 
considerable box-office revenues that accrued to ‘hit’ films, with the number one films in 
each list of Table 3 generating approximately 10 times that of the mean film. Between 
them, the top 20 films in Britain and the U.S. generated 10 and 12 per cent of the 
respective total revenues. At the other end of the distribution, the lowest revenue decile 
comprised the earnings of the lowest 842 and 645 ranked films in the two markets. Such 
marked inequalities of revenue result in high gini coefficients, estimated at 0.50 and 0.58 
for the British and U.S. datasets, respectively.60 
 
The high productivity on the part of the ‘hits’ of the season suggests a market in which 
products were vertically differentiated because, although audiences may rank films 
according to their personal preferences, a seasonally recurrent feature of the market for 
films is that some few films offer audiences the prospect of a level of pleasure that in 
almost every way exceeds that which they might anticipate from any among the rest of 
the season’s releases.61 The (outstanding) top 20 ranking films of each market – 
approximately the top 10 films of each of the two seasons covered by the sample – are 
listed in Table 3. In keeping with the role of stars as markers of quality, it is notable that 
certain generic and star characteristics have multiple representation in these lists, with the 
Astaire/Rogers musical comedies particularly popular in both markets.62 Other features 
common to both markets are the frequency of films that are set in the past, the 
prominence of British historical/Empire/military-type subjects, and the wide ranging 
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appeal of musicals, including operettas. In addition to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers (4 
films), and Clark Gable (3 films), Irene Dunne, Myrna Loy, Grace Moore, William 
Powell, and Jeanette MacDonald all appear more than once on the U.S. lists, while 
Robert Donat appears in two British-made British Top 20 films and Fredric March, and 
Merle Oberon, appear once in a different film in each list.63  Thus, there is some evidence 
to suggest that the production of hit films may not be a purely random process, although 
it is also clear that there is no simple and stable formula for the production of hits. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The already noted asymmetry between the performance of British and American films in 
the other’s market is also apparent from Table 3.  While all of the top 20 films in the U.S. 
chart emanate from Hollywood, in the British chart, British films take only seven of the 
top 20 berths. Furthermore, nine Hollywood films are common to both lists, with the 
remaining four Hollywood-made British top 20 films occupying ranks 23, 34, 103 and 97 
in the U.S. charts. In contrast the seven British films featured in the British top 20 were – 
in the order in which they appear – ranked 104, 281, 379, 154, 206, 237, 234 in the U.S. 
Although British audiences perceived these seven British films to be outstanding 
productions, American audiences indubitably did not. Indeed, this sentiment seems to be 
true of British productions as a whole since, of the 75 films released onto the U.S. market 
during this period, the highest rank, 104, was that achieved by The Scarlet Pimpernel, 
while the median-ranked British film title took the 751st berth. For all of the corporate 
energy Gaumont British expended on the U.S. market during this period, the returns from 
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the 32 films it marketed through its own distribution company were meagre, with a top 
rank of 228 (It’s Love Again) and a mean rank of 583.  
 
VI 
In order to understand the relative lack of success that British producers experienced in 
the U.S., it is important to recognise that in the mid-1930s British producers were 
entering an established, mature and dynamic market, and can be argued to have greatly 
underestimated the commitment that was required to achieve success in this market.  U.S. 
producers had a well-defined market presence, built up over a considerable period of 
time, and had developed a range of evolving film-making strategies.  In particular, in 
releasing upwards of 50 films annually throughout the 1930s, each of the major 
Hollywood studios had developed a scale and breadth of film production that was almost 
overwhelming within the context of the activities of their British counterparts.   
 
However, this is not to suggest that consumer tastes were so well understood and 
predictable that U.S. producers could produce hit films at will.  The process was still 
subject to considerable levels of uncertainty, and strategies had to be developed to 
attenuate the risks associated with film production.  Thus, while it would generally be 
accepted that the size of a film’s production budget has a bearing on the creative and 
logistical flexibility for making a film that might be expected to become a hit – a positive 
relationship would be expected between production budgets and revenues – a closer 
examination of the relationship between the size of production budgets and the revenues 
(and producer profits) earned by films reveals a much more complex set of relationships. 
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The sub-text here is that, typically, audiences are attracted by the promise of spectacle, 
high-salary charismatic performers, and visibly expensive production values (as opposed 
to the rare, but hugely profitable, low/modest-budget ‘sleeper’ hit).     
 
Figure 3 shows a scatter of U.S. distributor rental incomes against production costs, in 
constant 1929 prices, for the 1,796 films distributed by MGM, RKO and Warner Bros. 
for which production cost data were available, over the period 1930 to 1942.64 Thus while 
there was certainly a broad tendency for rental incomes to increase with production 
budgets, the more notable characteristic of Figure 3 is the increasing instability of this 
relationship as production budgets increased – revenues became increasingly variable the 
higher the production budget.  The consequences of this instability are reflected in a 
scatter of distributor profits generated in the U.S. market against production budgets, 
shown in Figure 4, where the loss-making potential of high budget films can be seen 
directly (for contextual purposes a number of the more prominent film titles are also 
indicated).  Indeed, of the 10 most expensive films produced over the period, 8 made 
losses, and in most cases very substantial losses.  These 10 films were all released in the 
latter half of the 1930s, a decade during which the real average production costs of films 
doubled as producers sought to capture market share with films of ever increasing 
production values, within a market that was experiencing strong growth after the impact 
of the depression – real consumers’ expenditure on movie going increased by 40 percent 
between 1932 and 1940.  
 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
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However, this expansion in production budgets was presumably also encouraged by the 
exhibition arms of the majors, given that their objective was to exhibit films that attracted 
large audiences and therefore yielded large revenues.  Mae Huettig has argued that it was 
the exhibition arms that controlled the ‘purse strings’;65 two-thirds of the total capital of 
the majors was invested in theatres during the 1930s, and thus a film that may not have 
been profitable for producers might still have generated sufficient demand from 
exhibitors to make exhibition worthwhile. Thus, while eight of the ten most expensive 
films featured in Figures 3 and 4 lost money for the production wing of the studio, they 
were by no means unpopular.  Eight of these films achieved ranks of between 1 and 6 in 
the resulting domestic revenue distributions of their respective release years (albeit 
revenue distributions restricted here just to the films released by MGM, RKO and Warner 
Bros. of which there was an annual average of 145 films over this period). Of course, the 
ideal was a film that generated profits for both production and exhibition, and from 
Figure 4 such films can be seen to have had relatively modest budgets.  Indeed, virtually 
all of the high profit films had production budgets of less than $2 million, with many 
costing less than $1 million. Although many of these high budget films were not 
profitable, most were critically acclaimed, and so, at least artistically, were considered 
successful. Furthermore, the studios channelled considerable R&D expenditure into these 
showcase films in the backing-a-hunch/serendipitous search for artistic innovation, from 




Nevertheless, the extent to which such experimentation was undertaken could only be 
justified within the context of the overall profitability of film production.  It is useful to 
interpret this process as one of the construction of an annual film portfolio, with the 
objective of maximising the rate of return on this portfolio, and risk-taking being justified 
within the context of the studios being able to cross-subsidise within the portfolio.  With 
MGM, RKO and Warner Bros. each producing between 30 and 60 films annually during 
the 1930s, these annual film portfolios took on quite complex structures, in terms of the 
spread of film genres, the allocation of actors and directors across the portfolio and the 
wide range of production budgets that were utilised.  Considering just one dimension of 
these portfolio structures – the variation in production budgets – an insight can be gained 
into the evolving nature of the strategic responses made by the studios over the decade.  
Thus, the studios could be interpreted as each year having constructed a portfolio of 
films, consisting of low, medium and high budget films (broadly, ‘B’, ‘A’ and ‘super A’ 
films).  The key strategic decision was the allocation of production resources to each of 
these budgetary categories.  Low budget films tended to be consistently profitable, given 
the relatively low levels of demand they needed to achieve to cover costs, but only 
generated relatively modest levels of profit and hence made limited contributions to 
annual profit targets.  High budget films, on the other hand, had the potential to generate 
very high levels of demand and hence profits, and consequently a small number of 
successful high budget films could dominate profit distributions, both at a point in time 
and over time.  An outstanding example derived from two high budget musicals that 
Warner Bros. produced in the 1932/33 season – 42nd Street and Gold Diggers of 1933.  
These two films accounted for just 7.5 per cent of Warner’s aggregate production budget 
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for the season, but generated 31 per cent of the season’s U.S. profits.  An even more 
extreme example was that of RKO and the success it experienced with its Fred Astaire 
and Ginger Rogers musicals, eight of which were released between 1933/34 and 1937/38.  
These were all relatively high budget films, and in total cost $7.4 million to produce (in 
1929 prices), generating aggregate profits in the U.S. of $4 million, a level of profits that 
exactly matched the aggregate profits generated by all 332 low budget films that RKO 
produced between 1929/30 and 1941/42.  However, equally, one or two unsuccessful 
high budget films could produce losses such as to wipe out the aggregate profits that were 
generated by any number of more modestly costed film projects.  For example, in the 
1937/38 season MGM produced two high budget films – Marie Antoinette and Conquest 
– that absorbed 19 per cent of that season’s total production budget but jointly produced 
losses in the U.S. of $1.4 million, within a context in which the 16 medium budget films 
that MGM produced during the season generated profits of $2.7 million.   
 
As is clear from Figures 3 and 4, the general picture that emerges is one of a volatile 
production environment, with large variations in profitability both within and between 
years.  Of the 1,796 films shown in Figure 4, a third made losses in the U.S. market.  In 
terms of the high budget films (which accounted for just 19 per cent of all films 
produced), 43 per cent generated losses, with just 26 per cent of low budget films making 
losses.67 However, the attraction of high budget production was the potential it offered for 
generating substantial profits – over half of the profits generated by all 1,796 films were 
generated by the 194 profitable high budget films.  The downside was that high budget 
production was the source of most of the losses generated – the 145 loss making high 
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budget films accounted for over half of all film losses.  Thus not only was it necessary to 
accept that within a season some film projects would inevitably make losses, and 
sometimes very large losses, but entire seasons might be unsuccessful.  The key was to 
achieve an appropriate mix between innovative yet risky film projects and more modest, 
safer projects.   There were no obvious formulae for producing hit films, in the sense of 
such formulae being stable over time.  Certainly there were particular genres or narrative 
themes that achieved marked success at various points in time – the Warner Bros. 
musicals in the early 1930s was one example – but audiences soon tired of these as 
successful innovations emerged.  The simple allocation of large production budgets was 
not even a necessary, let alone a sufficient condition, for financial success.  Nevertheless, 
‘playing safe’ was also not an option, and risk-taking was integral to the process.   
 
A further potential barrier to entry for British producers to the U.S. market was the degree 
of monopoly power exercised by the major Hollywood studios.  In Table 3, it is evident 
that certain studios were responsible for more than one top ranking film, with MGM, 
RKO and Columbia prominent in both lists, but joined in the British section by the 
British studios, Gaumont British and London Films. Indeed, it is tempting to frame 
Hollywood analytically in terms of the industrial organisation literature on monopoly 
power: that is, as a Cournot-type oligopoly in which the incumbents formed realistic ex 
ante expectations about the factor input quality and the quantity of product released onto 
the market by rivals and competed accordingly.68 Table 4 reports industrial concentration 
statistics.69 They are notable on two counts. First, the pattern of Hollywood studio 
penetration in the U.S. market is replicated, albeit at a lower level, in the British market. 
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Second, the degree of industrial concentration when measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) does not suggest significant levels of monopoly power for which, 
since the 1984 merger guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission, the threshold value 
of 1800 has been used as an indicator of excessive market power, while measures under 
1000 are indicative of no market power of significance.70 None the less, there was 
certainly a perception, particularly amongst smaller independent exhibitors and pursued 
by the Department of Justice, of the major studios exploiting their monopoly power 
during the 1930s, via their practice of block booking and blind selling.71  Indeed, so 
strong and persistent was this perception that it resulted in the Paramount Decree of 1948, 
forcing the major studios to divest themselves of their cinemas.  This would suggest that 
the market power exercised by the majors was somewhat greater than that implied by the 
relatively modest levels of the HHIs in Table 4.  However, subsequent re-evaluations of 
the Paramount Decree have argued that the industry practices that were the focus of the 
Decree, rather than being anti-competitive, were in fact rational solutions to complex 
industrial organisational problems, with mutual advantages for both studios and 
exhibitors. 72 
 
These results are perhaps surprising given the extent of vertical integration in both 
markets, the highly differentiated nature of the product by which producers deliberately 
set out to influence demand, and the ability of audiences to form qualitative ex ante 
expectations and hence make rational choices between the products following release.73  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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While it was the case that both markets were dominated by a small number of firms, with 
MGM and Paramount the market leaders in both markets, audiences were not influenced 
as much by the studio’s trademark as they were by the anticipated pleasures promised by 
any single film. Evidence of the wide variance of box-office performance of films from 
each of the principal studios is given by the coefficient of variation statistics in Table 4, 
and further reinforced by Figure 3, which reflects the revenue performance of three of the 
majors over the decade.  If it is assumed that the size of a film budget signalled a studio’s 
conception of each film as an investment vehicle, and hence an imputed target revenue, 
then the variance of the revenues of films from that imputed value would be significantly 
greater than zero only if the audience’s perception of film quality differed from the 
studio’s conception of it.  From Figure 3 it is apparent that the heteroscedastic spread of 
revenues across the cost categories implied that there were marked differences between 
audience perception and producer conception, exhibiting the producer’s nightmare trend 
that variance increased with production cost.74   Even in the heyday of the studio system, 
risk was an integral part of film production. Indeed, the marked instability of revenues 
over time and between and within cost categories suggests that Hollywood should be 
perceived as an industry structure predicated upon the attenuation of risk. 
 
As argued above, the key to this instability was the short revenue-earning life of 
individual film products. Thereafter, for almost all titles, existence as a commodity 
ended. In the U.S. sample, based on the returns from Variety of the 969 films released 
during the 25 months of the investigation, only 25 were re-issues of ‘hit’ films from 
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previous years, none of which received more than a few exhibition dates in the sample set 
of cinemas. The record of re-issues in Great Britain was similar. More significant for this 
investigation was the speed with which the films played through the first run cinemas. 
Thus, for any given week the market distribution of revenues was highly skewed, with a 
small number of films doing the bulk of business. But, as today, the velocity of 
circulation was considerable, with most films passing through the sample set of cinemas 
within two months of release onto the American market.75 The consequence of this was 
that the configuration of demand was forever changing, the manner of which could not be 
known ex ante, while the general level of demand for films – the number of people 
regularly looking forward to ‘going to a movie’, but not just any movie – was stable. 
 
However, the development of stars did provide a focus for at least reducing the risk 
associated with any film project.  In bringing an identifiable characteristic to a film 
product that was widely admired and emulated, stars served as a kind of security. While 
film products were short-lived as commodities, their stars were influential, and more 
durable, ‘marker’ commodities. For instance, during the 25 months of the U.S. sample the 
top 5 ranking stars listed in Table 5 – Clark Gable, Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers 
(treated as a single star), Fredric March, William Powell and Shirley Temple – appeared 
respectively in nine, five, eight, eight and eight films.76 Between them, films featuring the 
top 20 ranked stars accounted for 46 per cent of the market revenue in the U.S.  But stars 
could only be developed via repeated exposure to audiences, and a studio’s annual film 
portfolio provided an ideal vehicle for such exposure.  It may have taken a studio a 
number of seasons to develop a star, with actors being distributed throughout the 
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portfolio from season to season, and a small number emerging as having developed ‘star 
qualities’ as perceived by audiences.  This provided a further rationale for studios 
employing diversified film portfolios – the more widely diversified the portfolio the more 
likely it was that stars could be identified and developed.  Certainly within the British 
context British stars had emerged and had been developed, stars such as Robert Donat, 
Jack Hulbert, Leslie Howard, Leslie Banks, Anna Neagle, Jack Buchanan, Merle Oberon, 
Jessie Matthews, Ralph Lynn, Will Hay and Gracie Fields.  However, given the limited 
engagement of British producers with the U.S. market, these stars were virtually 
unknown to American audiences.77 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
  
VIII 
The film industry is an interesting and early example of an industry catering to mass 
consumer tastes. During the interwar period, it was by far the most popular paid-for- 
leisure activity on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, from the record of its diffusion 
rates in both countries, film was not only equally popular in Britain and the U.S., but, as 
important, equally accessible and affordable, unlike the case of many other consumer 
products.78  
 
Because, during the studio system, films from the same studio shared common 
production inputs it would not have been the case that ‘In effect each movie [was] a 
separate firm, with its own profit statement’, as Weinstein has suggested, when analysing 
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the very different contractual arrangements associated with film making during the post-
studio period.  Nevertheless, it certainly was (and remains) the case that each film had its 
own demand curve.79 However, as is clear from Figures 1 and 2, although the market 
share of the top ranking films was many times greater than that of the median ranked 
film, the contribution made by the leading films was relatively low, with the top 20 films 
– more or less the annual top 10 films of each of the datasets – contributing 
approximately ten per cent of the market. In other words, 90 per cent of the annual 
revenue in each market was generated by non-top 10 films.80  
 
The market for films was one in which audiences were attracted in very large numbers to 
make choices between the many attractions on offer to them. Crucially, however, 
audiences soon became weary of any particular film product – even the most popular.  
Thus films, in the absence of yet-to-be alternative commodity-resuscitating/life-extending 
media such as video, television in its various forms, and computers, had brief life cycles. 
The two datasets used in this study provide an unparalleled source of information 
concerning the week-by-week changes, in each national market, in the configuration of 
what films were playing where, and for whom.  
 
In this environment of changing audience taste for particular styles of film and the stars 
who appeared in them, the principal vertically integrated studios of Hollywood were 
making approximately 50 films per annum during the middle years of the 1930s. This 
heavy investment in film products required strategies for the attenuation of the risk 
inherent in being committed to launching so many new products annually. Clearly, the 
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studios attempted to influence demand for their product through their own marketing, 
publicity and production departments. In addition, from Tables 3 and 5 it is apparent that 
particular stars and genres were important markers of quality. It is further argued that 
R&D expenditure was an important element of cost in big budget films as studios 
competed to qualitatively differentiate their products and create new aesthetic, narrative 
and phonic fashions for filmgoers. Elsewhere, we have shown how studios spread their 
risk through configuring their annual product in the manner of an investment portfolio.81  
 
The industry was geared to guaranteeing supply, while responding to revenue-sensitive 
variations in audience preferences. In its efforts – largely successful – to dominate the 
supply of films on a global scale, Hollywood early in its history understood the politico-
cultural, as well as the economic, efficacy of having its own trade association through 
which self-interested domestic and foreign policies could be, and are, vigorously 
pursued.82  
 
The British market for films was extremely important for Hollywood producers.83 
However, while Hollywood films dominated the British market and were an integral part 
of the experience of filmgoing in Britain, British films made little impact in the U.S., and 
never achieved an analogous status in the reckonings of American filmgoers, an 
asymmetry which made it extremely difficult for British producers to make films of 
comparable input quality, although it would seem that where they did, British audiences 
were appreciative. Given the preparedness of U.S. exhibitors to take potentially high 
revenue generating films from various sources, it is likely that the relative lack of success 
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of British films in the U.S. market can be explained at least in part in terms of cultural 
barriers on the part of U.S. audiences. However, it could also be argued that British 
producers had little understanding of the dynamic nature of the U.S. market and its 
cultural characteristics.  In Section VI the extensive nature of the annual film portfolios 
that were released by MGM, RKO and Warner Bros. during the 1930s was emphasised, 
and the attempts by British producers to break into the U.S. market must be evaluated 
within this context.   
 
Thus while Gaumont-British made strenuous efforts to break into the U.S. market, via the 
release of 32 films between 1934 and 1936,84 such a commitment, for such a relatively 
short period of time, is almost insignificant within the context of annual film production 
activities of the majors.  By releasing some 50 films per season, not only did each of the 
majors place a wide variety outputs before its potential audiences, but its understanding 
of its market also evolved over time and its film making strategies developed 
accordingly.  It may well be the case that U.S. audiences were culturally resistant to 
British films, but they were exposed to these films for such a short period of time that 
there was little chance of these cultural barriers breaking down. However, just as 
importantly, British producers had little opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of 
the nature of U.S. audiences and therefore to formulate appropriate and consistent film 
making strategies. Finally, to the extent that stars were important markers of quality, 
British producers had no opportunity to establish a roster of non-parochial, ‘international’ 
stars, given their brief engagement with the U.S. market. To compound this predicament, 
the pool of talented, ambitious British film actors was trawled for those with 
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‘international’ potential by the Hollywood studios’ talent spotters, and their ‘catches’ 
were shipped across the Atlantic for the grooming and exposure that the home industry 
could not provide.    
 
It is this asymmetric performance of British films that forms the basis of Jarvie’s claim 
about the parasitic nature of the British industry: that in the absence of Hollywood the 
market space in which the British industry developed during the 1930s would have been 
much reduced. It is true that the market share statistics in Table 4 show that two British 
studios – Gaumont British and London Films, both of which marketed their products in 
the U.S. – had between them a 10 per cent share of the British market during the mid-
1930s, achieving high levels of recognition and popularity for their products among 
domestic audiences. Indeed, both the distributor and exhibitor quota was exceeded by 
some margin for each year between 1930 and 1936, providing further evidence that 
British films were genuinely popular with British audiences.85 In attempting to break out 
of the straitjacket of the domestic market, the two companies helped establish a 
commercial framework for a new British industry during the 1930s. However, their 
failure to make a significant impact in the U.S. meant that ultimately they were dependent 
on the home market, along with other, less ambitious, British producers, competing with 
their larger, more highly resourced, rivals from Hollywood. 
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Cinemas 88 104 
Total seats 153,106 282,674 
Average seats per cinema 1,740 2,718 
Average mid-range price £0.09 $0.40 
Box-office revenue N/a $121,114,613  
Films Screened 1,213 969 
Total Screenings 13,237 11,016 
Single-bill programmes 2,163 6,384 
Double-bill programmes 5,537 2,310 
Maximum bookings for a film 34 29 
Median film bookings 12.5 11 
Films with only one booking 63 110 
Programmes found with ‘Live Acts’ N/a 1,545 
Note: ‘Total Screenings’ is derived as single bill programmes plus 2*double-bill programmes. A ‘booking’ 
represents a screen engagement at one of the cinemas in the sample set. The number of live acts in the U.S. 
is an underestimate since the monthly tables format in which Variety reported box-office information and 
from which the bulk of the dataset was drawn did not always include all of the live acts reported in the 
weekly text reports. In Britain ‘live acts’ were far less common and not reported in the trade press.  
Sources: KineWeekly for Great Britain and Variety for the U.S. 
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Table 2, Exhibition records of selected sample cinemas. 
 Films 
Screened 




(in which the cinema listed belongs to the city’s dominant  chain) 
Albee,Cincinnati-RKO   Chicago,Chicago-ParamountPublix  
Columbia 5 5 60,000  Columbia 8 12 403,200 
Fox/TCF 20 19.5 235,800  Fox/TCF 19 21 671,600 
MGM 28 30 409,000  MGM 18 21 665,400 
Paramount 21 20.5 227,000  Paramount 26 30 1,059,100 
RKO 16 16 226,750  RKO 1 1 25,400 
UA 9 9 105,500  WB 24 26 786,600 
Universal 3 3 34,500  Universal 1 1 55,800 
WB 6 6 79,400  Total 97 112 3,667,100 
Total 108 109 1,377,950      
     Stanley, Philadelphia- Warner Bros.  
Palace,Washington-Loew's (MGM)   Columbia 6 8 118,300 
Fox/TCF 20 34 473,500  Fox/TCF 2 2 32,500 
MGM 25 48 794,500  MGM 15 27 447,700 
Paramount 16 22 302,500  Paramount 25 31.5 340,400 
UA 9 11 142,500  RKO 7 11 182,500 
Total 70 113.5 1,713,000  UA 1 1 9,200 
     Universal 4 4 55,500 
Warfield, San Francisco -Fox   Warner Bros. 22 22 275,700 
Fox/TCF 31 24.5 482,250  Others 2 2 25,000 
MGM 25 30.5 622,550  Total 84 108.5 1,486,800 
Paramount 22 17.0 317,500      
Warner Bros. 26 21.5 397,250      
Others 5 5 73,750      
Total 109 98.5 1,893,600      
         
 
Section B 
(in which the cinema listed does not belong to the city’s dominant  chain) 
 
Metropolitan-Brooklyn-Loew's (MGM)  Earle-Washington-Warner Bros.  
Columbia 1 0.5 8,000 Columbia 16 16 291,000 
Fox/TCF 18 14.5 209,500 Paramount 28 28 486,000 
MGM 72 74 1,158,750 RKO 1 1 15,500 
Paramount 1 1 12,000 TCF 1 1 10,000 
RKO 1 0.5 7,500  WB 61 62 1,099,000 
UA  12 9 131,500  Others 4 4 65,000 
Universal 3 2 29,750  Total 111 112 1,966,500 
Others 8 5.5 101,500    
Total 114 105.5 1,658,500    
Notes: The total number of films screened by each of the cinemas counts both films on double-bill 
programmes. The difference in this aggregate across cinemas reflects differences in the propensity of 
cinemas to screen double bill programmes and to hold films over. The ‘Weeks’ columns count the number 
of weeks that films were shown at each of the cinemas. Screenings count films that fall just outside of this 
time frame where the bulk of those films’ screenings took place within the time frame. For this reason, the 
Chicago, Chicago and the Palace, Washington have more than 109 weeks recorded. In the case of cinemas 


































Figure 1.  Frequency Distribution of POPSTAT Data, Great Britain 
Figure 2.  Frequency Distribution of Box-Office Data, U.S. 































Film Year Sample 
BoxOffice
$U.S. 
Studio Genre Star1 Star2 
United States       
1/28 San Francisco 1936 1,163,400 MGM Historical/action/melodrama Gable, Clark MacDonald, Jeanette 
2/4 Top Hat 1935 1,135,500 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
3/15 Swing Time 1936 999,700 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
4/5 Great Ziegfeld, The 1936 966,700 MGM Musical biopic Powell, William Loy, Myrna 
5/3 Mutiny On The Bounty 1935 939,100 MGM Historical naval drama/ adventure Gable, Clark Laughton, Charles 
6/21 Roberta 1935 873,650 RKO Musical romantic comedy Dunne, Irene Astaire, Fred 
7/14 Follow The Fleet 1936 806,600 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
8/36 Anthony Adverse 1936 793,000 WB Historical/action/adventure March, Fredric De Havilland, Olivia 
9/10 Love Me Forever 1935 745,900 Columbia Musical/operetta Moore, Grace Carrillo, Leo 
10/20 David Copperfield 1935 740,700 MGM Historical literary adaptation Fields, W.C. Barrymore, Lionel 
11/2 One Night Of Love 1934 733,150 Columbia Musical/operetta Moore, Grace Carminati, Tullio 
12/42 My Man Godfrey 1936 684,200 Universal Comedy Powell, William Lombard, Carole 
13/22 Gay Divorcee, The 1934 671,500 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
14/25 Broadway Bill 1934 668,900 Columbia Romantic Comedy Baxter, Warner Loy, Myrna 
15/92 Gorgeous Hussy, The 1936 657,800 MGM Historical drama Crawford, Joan Taylor, Robert 
16/7 Mr Deeds Goes To Town 1936 647,000 Columbia Comedy/social comment Cooper, Gary Arthur, Jean 
17/62 China Seas 1935 644,900 MGM Action/adventure Gable, Clark Harlow, Jean 
18/1 Modern Times 1936 643,270 Chaplin Comedy Chaplin, Charles Goddard, Paulette 
19/51 Rose Marie 1936 634,100 MGM Musical/operetta MacDonald, Jeanette Eddy, Nelson 
20/39 G-Men 1935 626,200 WB Crime/police drama Cagney, James Dvorak, Ann 




  POPSTAT     
1/18 Modern Times 1936 83.26 Chaplin Comedy Chaplin, Charles Goddard, Paulette 
2/23 Lives of a Bengal Lancer 1935 63.14 Paramount Historical Empire Adventure Cooper, Gary Tone, Franchot 
3/5 Mutiny On The Bounty 1936 59.36 MGM Historical naval drama/ adventure Gable, Clark Laughton, Charles 
4/2 Top Hat 1935 54.20 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
5/4 Great Ziegfeld, The 1936 53.29 MGM Musical biopic Powell, William Loy, Myrna 
6/104 Scarlet Pimpernel 1935 51.20 London Films* Historical Drama Howard, Leslie Oberon, Merle 
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7/16 Mr Deeds Goes To Town 1936 47.43 Columbia Comedy/social comment Cooper, Gary Arthur, Jean 
8/34 Show Boat 1936 46.65 Universal Musical Dunne, Irene Jones, Allan 
9/281 Iron Duke 1935 45.68 Gaumont British* Historical drama Arliss, George Terriss, Ellaline 
10/9 Love Me Forever 1935 44.71 Columbia Musical/operetta Moore, Grace Carrillo, Leo 
11/379 Sanders of the River 1935 43.83 London Films* Empire drama/adventure Robeson, Paul Banks, Leslie 
12/103 Dark Angel 1935 42.73 Goldwyn Romantic melodrama March, Fredric Oberon, Merle 
13/154 Ghost Goes West 1936 41.60 London Films* Comedy fantasy Donat, Robert Parker, Jean 
14/7 Follow the Fleet 1936 41.41 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
15/3 Swing Time 1936 40.95 RKO Musical romantic comedy Astaire, Fred Rogers, Ginger 
16/206 Things To Come 1935 40.65 London Films* Futuristic drama Massey, Raymond Richardson, Ralph 
17/237 39 Steps 1935 40.20 Gaumont British* Comedy crime drama Donat, Robert Carroll, Madeleine 
18/97 Clive of India 1935 39.41 20th Century Historical biography Colman, Ronald Young, Loretta 
19/234 Escape Me Never 1935 39.01 British and 
Dominions* 
Romantic melodrama Bergner, Elizabeth Sinclair, Hugh 
20/10 David Copperfield 1935 35.50 MGM Historical literary adaptation Fields, W.C. Barrymore, Lionel 
Note: * represent British studio productions. 
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Columbia 91 8,303,227 91,244 1.62 6.86 47.00 
MGM 110 23,939,339 217,630 1.01 19.77 390.69 
Paramount 131 19,539,464 149,156 0.90 16.13 260.27 
RKO 82 13,366,878 163,011 1.34 11.04 121.81 
TCF 107 16,910,144 158,039 0.86 13.96 194.94 
Universal 69 6,444,183 93,394 1.26 5.32 28.31 
WB 124 17,124,359 138,100 0.93 14.14 199.91 
Total ‘A' Studios 714 105,047,394 147,125  86.73 1,242.93 
Others 255 16,067,219 63,009  13.27  
Total All Studios 969 121,114,613 124,989  100 1,260.37* 
       
 





   
Columbia 75 546.05 7.28 1.13 5.99 35.84 
GB/Gains 41 667.88 16.29 0.55 7.32 53.62 
London Films 9 258.87 28.76 0.54 2.84 8.06 
MGM 94 1,116.98 11.88 0.83 12.25 149.99 
Paramount 123 1,221.47 9.93 0.75 13.39 179.36 
RKO 82 696.44 8.49 1.09 7.64 58.31 
TCF 91 782.30 8.60 0.64 8.58 73.57 
Universal 55 372.75 6.78 1.05 4.09 16.70 
WB 107 865.23 8.09 0.67 9.49 90.00 
Total ‘A' Studios 677 6,527.97 9.64  71.57 665.46 
Others 536 2,592.51 4.84  28.43  
All Studios 1213 9,120.47 7.52  100 692.34* 
* The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
Notes: The U.S. data are for the period October 1934 to October 1936, Source: Variety. The British data are 








Table 5. Top 20 ranking stars by box-office in the U.S. market between October 1934 and October 1936. 
Rank Star Studio Films Box-office revenue
(U.S. dollars) 


















1 Clark Gable MGM 9 5,202,745 0.043 0.043 578,083 2 3 7 9 4 
2 Astaire/Rodgers RKO 5 4,486,950 0.037 0.080 897,390 4 5 5 5 0 
3 Fredric March various 8 4,060,066 0.034 0.114 507,508 1 1 7 8 1 
4 William Powell MGM 8 3,571,750 0.029 0.143 446,469 1 2 4 8 1 
5 Shirley Temple TCF 8 3,456,950 0.029 0.172 432,119 0 0 5 8 0 
6 Claudette Colbert various 7 2,940,650 0.024 0.196 420,093 0 0 5 7 2 
7 Warner Baxter TCF 8 2,864,900 0.024 0.219 318,322 0 1 3 6 1 
8 Gary Cooper Paramount 7 2,770,300 0.023 0.242 395,757 0 1 3 7 2 
9 Jean Harlow MGM 6 2,730,100 0.023 0.265 455,017 0 1 4 6 0 
10 Jeanette MacDonald MGM 4 2,699,600 0.022 0.287 674,900 1 2 4  0 
11 Joan Crawford MGM 5 2,477,395 0.020 0.308 495,479 0 1 5 5 2 
12 James Cagney WB 7 2,310,300 0.019 0.327 330,043 0 1 3 5 2 
13 Irene Dunne various 5 2,302,116 0.019 0.346 460,423 1 1 3 4 1 
14 W.C. Fields Paramount 6 2,108,850 0.017 0.363 351,475 1 1 2 4 0 
15 Will Rogers Fox 6 2,016,350 0.017 0.380 336,058 0 0 3 3 2 
16 Katherine Hepburn RKO 6 1,996,516 0.016 0.396 332,753 0 0 3 3 0 
17 Grace Moore Columbia 3 1,926,350 0.016 0.412 642,117 1 2 3 3 1 
18 Bing Crosby Paramount 5 1,826,333 0.015 0.427 365,267 0 0 2 5 0 
19 Miriam Hopkins various 5 1,797,700 0.015 0.442 359,540 0 0 3 5 0 
20 Ronald Colman TCF 4 1,655,500 0.014 0.456 413,875 0 0 3 4 0 
Note: The revenue values are derived by summing the box-office performance of the films in which the star is first or second billed, but does not include re-
release revenues, which in all cases were relatively very small in comparison to new releases. The studio column refers to the studio that held the star’s contract. 
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‘quota quickies’.  See Low, Film making, pp. xiv and 33; Jarvie, Hollywood’s Overseas 
Campaign, ch. 5; Sedgwick, Popular Filmgoing, ch. 4.    
34 Rowson, Statistical Survey, p. 108. The extent to which the Quota requirements were 
exceeded is evident in the table below. 
Renters and Exhibitors Quotas 1928-29 to 1935 to 1936. (Figures in percentages) 








1928-29 7.5 19.9   
1929-30 10 14.5   
1930-31 10 15.0   
1931-32 12.5 19.6 10 21.6 
1932-33 15 20.3 12.5 23.7 
1933-34 17.5 24.1 15 26.1 
1934-35 17.5 23.8 15 25.5 
1935-36 20 26.6 20 27.4 
Note: For the exhibitor’s quota the years 1928 to 1931 were not published by the Board 
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Source: Low, Film making, Table 6, Appendix, derived from Board of Trade records 
 
35 The history of film criticism suggests that there have been many films elevated to 
canonic status that were not so highly considered by contemporary audiences. See 
Klinger, Melodrama; and Staiger Interpreting Films for accounts of the various strands in 
the reception of films and how different agencies are affected by the context in which the 
reception takes place. 
36 DeVany and Walls, ‘Bose-Einstein Dynamics’, p. 1497. Exceptionally, the opening 
nights of particularly eagerly awaited films were priced more highly. Variety, 4 
September 1935, report for the opening of Top Hat (1935) at the Pantages theatre, Los 
Angeles. 
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during and after this month will be included. Likewise included are the records of films 
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December 1936. The dataset remains largely unexploited by scholars and represents an 
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40 Sedgwick, ‘Product differentiation’, p. 682.  
41 This is doubly strange because at irregular intervals (between six weeks and three 
months) box-office reports of London’s West End cinemas appear in Variety during the 
period.  
42 These cinemas are listed in Sedgwick, Popular filmgoing, appendix. 1. The cinemas 
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43 The weighting for each cinema is given by its potential gross box office revenue, which 
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proportion of mean potential box office revenue of the sample cinema set. Hence the 
weights reflect the relative commercial status of each cinema.  
44 Due to the absence of any consistent box-office data for film releases in Britain, it is 
not possible to test directly the reliability of the POPSTAT measure as a reflection of 
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actual box-office revenue.  However, an indirect test can be performed.  Sedgwick, 
Popular filmgoing, Appendix 3, presents the POPSTATs for 166 films released by MGM, 
RKO and Warner Bros. in Britain between 1932 and 1937.  The actual U.S. and foreign 
distributor incomes generated by these films are also known (see Glancy, ‘MGM’; 
Glancy, ‘Warner Bros’; and Jewell, ‘RKO’).  Assuming that distributor incomes are 
highly correlated with box-office revenues, and that foreign distributor incomes are 
closely correlated with British revenues (because Britain was the main foreign market for 
U.S. films), then there should be a high correlation between POPSTAT and foreign 
distributor incomes.  The resulting correlation coefficient for the 166 films is 0.75, 
supporting the general robustness of POPSTAT as a reflection of British revenues.  
Additionally Walls, ‘Review’ subjected the POPSTAT data to further statistical scrutiny 
and also concluded that the measure provides a reliable reflection of box-office revenues. 
45 Given the exchange rate of £1=$4.5. 
46 Film Daily Yearbook, 1936, p. 39; Balio, Grand Design, ch. 4; Gomery, Shared 
pleasures, pp. 77-8. 
47 Hanssen, ‘Revenue-sharing’, p. 392. Unfortunately, in Britain, there is no systematic 
source of information on this aspect of cinemagoing as the Kine Weekly did not record 
‘live acts’, although it is likely that ‘live’ entertainment was not so widespread. See 
Eyles, Granda Theatres.  
48 The International Motion Picture Almanac, 1936-7, p. 992, derived from the 
Department of Commerce.  
49 International Motion Picture Almanac,1946-7. The populations of the cities from 
which the sample set of cinemas is drawn sum to just under 26 million.  
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55 Hanssen, ‘Block-booking’, p.423. See tab. 7 for further evidence. 
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57 King, ‘Stardom’, p. 162.  
58 Outside of the sample, the town of Bolton had two ABPC cinemas, but none owned by 
Gaumont British. Nevertheless, Gaumont British films were screened in the town, mostly 
by independent cinemas but occasionally on the screens of the rival chain’s cinemas. 
Sedgwick, Popular filmgoing, ch.5 
59 De Vany and Walls, Bose-Einstein’; De Vany and Walls, ‘Uncertainty’. 
60 These distributions underestimate the significance of top ranking films in relation to 
lower ranking films because films that share a billing are given an equal share of the box-
office, whereas in practice most double (dual) billing programmes consisted of an ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ film in which the former was booked on a percentage basis while the latter 
earned a flat rate sum.  
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62 For an assessment of the life cycle of the Astaire/Rogers films see Sedgwick, Popular 
filmgoing, ch. 9. 
63 Although shown later to be a top star, none of Shirley Temple’s eight films made the 
top 20 lists, although she had four top 50 successes in the U.S.  
64 The data set consists of 1,861 films, for which production cost data is available for 
1,796 of these films.  See Glancy, ‘MGM’; Glancy, ‘Warner Bros’; and Jewell, ‘RKO’, 
for a detailed description of the ledgers from which the data were extracted.  For the films 
produced by RKO and MGM the ledgers also provide data for profits/distribution costs 
and hence the profits generated by these films was available.  In the case of Warner Bros., 
film profits were not available, and these were estimated on the basis of the close 
relationship between distribution costs and the revenue and cost data in the RKO and 
MGM data set.  See Pokorny ‘Hollywood and the Risk Environment’, Appendix 10.1, for 
a fuller description of the estimation methodology employed.  The profits and revenue 
data used here relate to profits and revenues generated in the U.S. market only. 
65 Huettig, ‘Economic Control’, p. 291. 
66 In Hollywood at this time, R&D operated in three tiers. The first was at industry level, 
in which the technical departments of the studios, often in collaboration, engaged in 
research the results of which would benefit all studios in improving the visible and 
audible quality of the product. The little known history of this research is encapsulated in 
the citations for the Scientific or Technical ‘Oscar’ Awards, which started with the 
ceremony of 1930-31, and continue to this day. The existence and scope of this research 
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adds to the evidence that Hollywood was, and is, an industrial structure in a way that no 
other film industry has been. 
   The second tier was at studio level. The ‘majors’ invested extensively in permanent 
outdoor sets: house/shop exteriors, village/town/city streets, harbour quays, mini-jungles, 
etc. MGM and Warner Bros. had permanent theatre sets, with a stage and fully seated 
auditorium, and custom built facilities for all manner of lighting effects and camera 
movements. All these assets could be rented by other studios and independent producers, 
for example, Paramount used Twentieth Century Fox’s railway station in White 
Christmas (1954). 
    The third tier was at the level of a particular (big-budget) film. For The Great Ziegfeld 
(MGM, 1936), a very large revolving turntable stage was constructed – the biggest in the 
world, according to studio publicity – on which a tall helicoidal stairway was built to 
accommodate dozens of singers and dancers. The whole was concealed under a massive 
curtain, railed and threaded so that for the reveal it furled as the inverse of the structure. 
The whole set was seen again as footage in Ziegfeld Girl (MGM, 1941), with cut-in shots 
of Judy Garland performing on top of it. For Sweethearts (MGM, 1938, in Technicolor), 
the turntable supported a hillside path, the curtain disclosing Jeanette MacDonald and 
Nelson Eddy, who sing their way down as the curtain slowly descends. Their audience is 
seen singing along in a reverse shot, which, not by accident, shows MGM’s theatre 
auditorium to great advantage. Slightly modified, the curtain is seen in Lady Be Good 
(MGM, 1941), its moving folds choreographed as a ‘partner’ in one of Eleanor Powell’s 
dance routines.   
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67  A high budget film, in any given year, is here defined as a film whose production 
budget exceeded the average production budget of all the films distributed by the three 
studios in that year by 50 per cent or more.  Medium budget films were those that fell 
within the range of 75 to 150 per cent of the average cost of all films produced in the 
season, and low budget films were those costing less than 75 per cent of average cost.  
Note that these budgetary categories are defined in relative rather than absolute terms – 
they are defined relative the average production budget in any given year.  That is, it 
would be inappropriate to use absolute cost criteria – the (real) cost of a high budget film 
in the early 1930s was markedly different from the cost of high budget film in the late 
1930s, given the increase in average production budgets over the decade. Such a partition 
produced 339 high budget films, 573 medium budget films and 884 low budget films 
over the sample period. 
68 Martin, Industrial Economics.  
69 The market shares reported in Table 4 are strikingly similar to those for 1939, 
published by Huettig, ‘Economic control’. 
70 Coate and McChesney ‘ Enforcement’.  
71  See Hearing. 
  
72 De Vany and Eckert, ‘ Motion picture antitrust’, come to this conclusion in their 
analysis of the impact of the Paramount divorcement case of 1948 on the subsequent 
history of the studio system. It is also a conclusion consistent with Hanssen’s work on 
block-booking. See Hanssen, ‘Block-booking’. 
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73 This is an example of what Sutton has termed a stage II type industry, in which one 
would expect industrial concentration to increase as the market size increases. Sutton, 
Sunk Costs. 
74 See Sedgwick and Pokorny, ‘Risk environment’, for a fuller discussion of these issues 
in the case of Warner Bros. in the 1930s.  
75 Unlike the practice in the U.S., where films were released more or less simultaneously 
across the 31 exchanges, the London West-End cinemas showcased major productions 
for between one and three months prior to their general release, presumably allowing 
distributors time to estimate the number of prints and volume of publicity materials 
required. 
76 A similar table of top ranking stars in the British market can be found in Sedgwick, 
Popular filmgoing, tab. 9.2. 
77 On the economic rationale for the development of stars see also Bakker ‘Stars and 
Stories’. 
78 See Bowden and Offer, ‘Household appliances’. 
79 Weinstein, ‘Profit-sharing contracts’, p. 79. 
80 During the studio period (1925 to 1950) the contribution to total revenue made by the 
‘hit’ films of the season was much smaller than was the case during the post-studio era. 
Sedgwick, ‘Product differentiation’, tab. 4.  
81 Pokorny and Sedgwick, ‘Stardom’; Sedgwick and Pokorny, ‘Risk environment.’  
82 Jarvie, Hollywood’s overseas campaign, Trumpbour, Selling Hollywood, Ulff-Møller, 
Hollywood’s film wars, Vasey, World.  
83 Glancy, When Hollywood. 
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84  See Sedgwick, Popular filmgoing, Chapter 10, Table 10.3. 
85  Low, Film making, tab. 6. Low reports that in the 1935-36 season, when distributor 
and exhibitor quotas were 20 per cent of all footage, the Board of Trade registered 
volume of British films as 26.6 and 27.4 per cent respectively, figures that confirm the 
POPSTAT estimates found in Sedgwick Popular filmgoing, tab. 4.4. 
